rates of pathology covary, according to breakdown theory, because both are products either of the dissolving of social controls or of increased deprivation.
The most ardent critics of breakdown approach are researchers working within the ,,resource-mobilization" tradition: "Breakdown theories of collective action and collective violence," the Tillys (1975:290) state, "suffer from irreparable logic and empirical difficulties." There are four major arguments against the breakdown model. First, resource-mobilization theorists claim that grievances are sufficiently widespread through all societies at all times that, as a constant, they explain little of the variation in collective action. Although resource-mobilization theorists would agree with the proposition that individuals who engage in collective action are dissatisfied with the existing order, they assert that this proposition has no predictive power (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Oberschall, 1978:298; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1214-15; Snyder and Tilly, 1972) . Second, they maintain that the barrier to insurgency is the access to resources, and that disorganized groups are least likely to have the requisite resources. Disorganized populations will tend to be powerless and unable to launch an insurgency. Third, the resource-mobilization theorists argue that collective action flows out of struggles among well-defined groups. They find implausible the idea that collective action occurs when groups becomes less organized, rather than more organized.
Finally, resource-mobilization theorists rest much of their charge against the breakdown model on the purportedly negative evidence they and others have collected. Collective action does not covary with indicators of personal pathology (e.g., crime, suicide, alcoholism) (Lodhi and Tilly, 1973:296; Tilly et al, 1975 :76-81), non-membership in secondary and primary groups, (Gerlach and Hime, 1970; Useem, 1980) , and changes in the level of deprivation (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Skocpol, 1979:115) .
One focus of this research has been the urban riots of the 1960s. The evidence indicates that the rioters compared to their nonrioting counterparts, were more likely to be politically sophisticated, racially conscious, socialized in the North, victims of racial discrimination, and similar to their counterparts on such variables as income, education and occupation (Bryan, 1979; Caplan and Paige, 1968; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Sears and McConahay, 1973; Tomlinson, 1970) . Further, rioting tended to occur in cities that had blocked political opportunities for blacks (Eisenger, 1973) , whereas variation in the social conditions in the cities, such as percent of dilapidated housing as a measure of social disorganization, did not have an impact on riot propensity (once controls are introduced for region and percent of nonwhite population) (Spilerman, 1970; . The Tillys sum up their interpretation of the evidence:
As the dust settled and evidence accumulated, people began to see the discrepancies between what happened in Watts, Detroit, or elsewhere and theories which emphasized the explosion of accumulated discontent.... [The evidence] dispels] the idea that the participants came disproportionately from the ghetto's marginal, depressed, disorganized populations (Tilly et al., 1975:293) . These arguments have convinced most researchers in the discipline. Even those researchers otherwise critical of the resourcemobilization approach have sided with its stand against the breakdown model (Pinard, 1983) . Social movement/collective behavior textbooks now routinely report that breakdown model has, as Miller recently put it, "yielded few explanations of social movements that have withstood the probings of critics" (Miller, 1985 Despite the general opposition to the breakdown model, there is still research claiming support for it. One example is Piven and Cloward's (1977) work on the conditions that give rise to "poor" people's movements. They argue that "profound dislocations," such as massive unemployment or large scale migration, are needed "to virtually destroy the structures and routines of daily life" before protest can occur (1977:10) . A second exception has been Gurr and his collaborators, who found that "crime waves"-sharp increases in crimes of violence and theft-coincided with episodes of civil strife in London, Stockholm, New South Wales, and Calcutta during various periods in the 19th and 20th centuries (Gurr, 1976:82-90; Gurr et al., 1977:666-76 ).
Third, a number of researchers have found flaws in the standard research on the 1960s urban riots, and reported that properly assessed, the data support a breakdown model. Miller and associates (1976) show that many of the key tables supporting the resourcemobilization interpretation of the riots are percentaged in the wrong direction and conflate a critical distinction between nonviolent protesters and rioters. Once these errors are corrected, Miller and associates (1976:361) argue, the data reveal that the rioters were the "least socially integrated and lower elements of the community." Lieske (1978) found that cities with higher levels of social disorganization were more likely to experience a riot than cities with lower levels. Family disorganization (as measured by divorce and separation rates and illegitimacy rates), demographic dislocations (as measured by nonwhite population change and percent nonwhite change in residence), and high levels of criminal activity (as measured by police density) each contributed to the outbreak of the riots.
Finally, a greater number of researchers have been persuaded that deprivation and protest are causally associated (Unseem, 1980; Walsh, 1981 Walsh, , 1983 Pinard, 1983) . These researchers, however, still tend to reject the picture of collective action as the behavior of uprooted, disorganized people, and argue instead that organization and solidarity generate protest. They see the "breakdown" element as the failure of social mechanisms that were previously supposed to satisfy the needs of the discontented group, and not as the disruption of ties within that group. This paper takes a new look at the breakdown model. We show that the breakdown model can more adequately account for a particular instance of collective action, the New Mexico prison riot of February 2, 1980, than the rival resource-mobilization model.'
DATA AND RIOT
Before describing the data, we consider whether evidence on prison riots, in general, can be used to help adjudicate the debate between the breakdown and resourcemobilization approaches. Two considerations suggest it cannot. A mandated purpose of prisons is the deprivation of its clientele. Sykes (1958:63-83) describes five deprivationsliberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security-that together lead all inmates to feel that "life in the maximum security prison is depriving or frustrating in the extreme" (1958:63). As a possible consequence, the effect of deprivation on protest may be different in prisons than it is elsewhere.
Further, inmates in maximum security prisons are (of course) convicted felons. The factors that cause this atypical subpopulation to rebel may differ from those that generate rebellion in the populations considered by No group of inmates attained clear leadership status. Control over hostages, walkietalkies, and negotiations was fragmented, personalistic, and ephemeral. Some inmates, alone and in groups, took advantage of the situation to beat, rape, torture, and mutilate other inmates. One inmate had his head cut off with a shovel; another died from a screw-driver driven through his head; several others were immolated in their cells when inmates sprayed lighter fluid on them; and still others were tortured to death with acetylene torches. No inmate group made a serious attempt to prevent this. One inmate wrote:
there were many such group . .. ferociously slashing open stomaches, cutting of genitalia, beating on corpses that were strewn over the catwalks. The floors were covered with clotted pools of blood, the cells with bloody drag marks, the air with cries of men being tortured (Stone, 1982: 126) The assaults and killing were selective. The primary targets were inmate informants ("snitches") and objects of personal grudges. An inmate stated, respectively. Wherever possible, we have relied on the Attorney General's interviews rather than our own. First, the Attorney General's researchers obtained a sample representative of the inmate population at the time of the riot, whereas our sample overrepresented inmates with long sentences and recidivists. Second, the Attorney General's interviews were conducted soon after the riots, whereas ours occurred almost five years later. At this point, inmates' memories may have faded. This is especially salient in regard to inmates' assessment of changes in the prison from 1975 to 1980, for which we rely almost exclusively on the 1980 interviews. Still, we noticed no major discrepancy between the two rounds of interviews. 3 A psychiatrist who treated 9 of the 12 guard hostages reports that the inmates did, indeed, "succeed" in terrorizing the hostages (Hillman, 1981). In addition to the physical brutality, most experienced extreme feelings of fear and helplessness. Many of them said "goodby" in their minds to their loved ones; they imagined the grisly ways that inmates would kill them; and they visualized their dead bodies being discovered after the riot. Most experienced acute and disabling aftereffects for at least one year following the riot.
However, some guards received better treatment than others, and some were helped to escape by sympathetic inmates.
Not all inmates participated in the violence. This included the prison's 120 blacks (nine percent of the inmate population). They organized themselves for self-protection and eventually fled from the riot (OAGSNM, 1980:49).
Other inmates not participating in the brutality included a small group who had been active in prison reform and class-action suits. Led by respected jail-house lawyer Lonnie Duran, the group tried to transform the riot into a protest for prison reform (Colvin, 1982:459 ). Duran's group formulated a set of demands and established negotiations with the administration. Many inmates, however, simply paid no attention to or were unaware of these activities, and they had little impact on the course and outcome of the riot (Serrill and Katel, 1980; Colvin, 1982) . This evidence, though, does not persuade resource-mobilization theorists. Deprivation may have been a "constant" feature of the penitentiary, and thus cannot explain why the riot happened when it did. Indeed, Colvin (1982) rejects a deprivation explanation of the riot for just those reasons. He argues that inmate food and "services" had always been bad, and that while some services had deteriorated, others had improved. Further, guard brutality had been a permanent feature of the prison.
We 1980:12, 23) . In place of these programs, officials began a coercive "snitch" (informant) system. Officials threatened inmates with punishment unless they provided information on other inmates' misbehavior. The punishments included both direct disciplinary actions and the disclosure to other inmates that a noncooperative inmate was a "snitch" (OAGSNM, 1980:24 
OUTCOME OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Breakdown theorists and resource-mobilization theorists also disagree over the effectiveness of protest in solving the problems of an aggrieved constituency. Resourcemobilization theorists argue that protest can be an effective lever for change, but this depends upon the presence of a protest organization that can mobilize and channel unrest (e.g., Gamson and Schmeidler, 1984) . In its absence, the resources and skills necessary for effective protest cannot be aggregated and used efficiently. Breakdown theorists are internally divided. Traditionally, they have tended to dismiss protest as an agent for change. Protest was presumed to be an irrational response to the breakdown of the social order, and one incapable of forcing constructive change (e.g., Smelser, 1963; Kornhauser, 1959) .
Writing more recently, breakdown theorists Piven and Cloward (1977; see also, Cloward and Piven, 1984) share the resourcemobilization theorists' supposition that protest can effect change, but challenge the strategic value of building a protest organization. Piven and Cloward posit that "poor" constituencies do not have the skills, money and other resources needed to build and sustain an effective protest organization. The most effective option is to create pressure for reform through a strategy of mass defiance and disruption.
From our 1985 interviews, it was apparent that the 1980 riot was directly responsible for significant improvements in the living conditions, including the elimination of overcrowding, suppression of guard brutality, increased programming, less reliance on snitches for information, and fewer restrictions on personal property. Another inmate reported that the riot had caused groups outside of the prison to take an interest in the welfare of the inmates, which he and other inmates "appreciate a lot." Prior to the riot, he stated, "we had nothing coming from the public; nothing at all from the public." (U. and K. Interview). As further evidence that riot contributed to the improvements in the penitentiary, the Department of Corrections Secretary, interviewed on the fifth anniversary of the riot, stated that the 1980 riot had motivated him to try to improve the prison (Albuquerque Journal, 2/3/85, Sec. E, p. 4). He said that, in his opinion, the riot was the product of inmate idleness, crowding, and understaffing, and that he was seeking to remedy these problems. Calling the snitch system "disgusting and immoral," he stated that it had been banned. He felt that these changes would decrease the likelihood of another riot. (Albuquerque Journal, 2/3/85, Sec. E, p. 4).
DISCUSSION
During the 1970s, the State Penitentiary changed from a relatively benign and well-run institution, to one that was harsh, abusive, painfully boring, and without the "regulatory mechanisms" that had been in place in the early 1970s. With few programs or work assignments available, inmates remained confined to their living units with little to do or look forward to. Inmates became increasingly hostile not only toward prison officials and guards, but also toward one another.
The processes of disorganization within the prison not only increased the likelihood of a riot, but also determined its form. The fragmenting of bonds among inmates appears to have contributed to the weak and chaotic structures of leadership among the inmates during the riot, as well as to the brutal attacks of some inmates against other inmates.
This case study has a number of implications for the study of collective action. It demonstrates that researchers have been too quick to reject the breakdown model. The New Mexico riot appears to have been (in part) a response to the prison disorganization that began dramatically around 1975. The riot was a product of the termination of inmate programs, crowding, idleness, and a generally poorly-administered prison system. Furthermore, the alternative resource-mobilization model cannot account for the riot. There is no evidence whatsoever that the prison riot occurred in 1980 because of an increase in inmate resources or solidarity, which resource-mobilization theorists say must precede collective action.
At the heart of controversy between breakdown and resource-mobilization theorists is the issue of the relationship between crime/ deviance and collective action. Resourcemobilization theorists hold that crime/deviance and collective action arise from different, if not opposite, processes. They argue that crime/ deviance and collective action should not covary or, if they do, the links should be weak and negative. Breakdown theorists argue that crime/deviance and collective action covary because they arise from the same underlying condition. On this point, the New Mexico data support the breakdown position. The 1980 riot followed a period of dramatic increase in the level of personal violence in the prison, as described by the inmate interviews and as seen in the large increase in the number of inmates in protective custody and segregation.
Black (1984) has recently argued that much crime is an effort to seek justice by those who have a grievance but to whom law is relatively unavailable. Youths may vandalize property, for example, because they have grievances against adults but no legal recourse. Seen in this light, crime has much in common with protest (even as resource-mobilization theorists conceive the latter), in that both express a grievance by one person or group against another person or group. Resourcemobilization theorists have failed to see this link between protest and crime, not so much because of weaknesses in their model of protest, but because they underestimate the moral component of crime.4
The interviews and increasing punishment suggest, as well, a causal connection between crime and collective action. A secure, lowcrime environment is a valued condition, and its absence may produce anger toward authorities or toward others in the community, or toward both. In New Mexico, inmates complained bitterly about the beatings and the absence of security in the prison before the riot. This dissatisfaction appears to have fueled the riot. When authorities respond regressively to increases in crime/deviance, but do not destroy all forms of resistance, the increased repression may add a further impetus to collective action. This proposition fits well with the evidence for the New Mexico riot. The prison administration responded to the increased level of crime/deviance with a coercive snitch system and a greater use of solitary confinement. Both of these policies appear to have angered inmates and to have helped motivate them to start the riot.
These findings, though, do not indicate the utility of accepting the full breakdown model as a general account of collective action. The case study provides no support for the presumption held by some breakdown theorists that collective action inevitably fails. The living conditions of the State Penitentiary were substantially better in 1985 than they were before the riot. The 1980 riot contributed to these improvements.
Furthermore, the evidence does not give much support to the Durkheimian strand of breakdown theory which emphasizes anomie, egoism, and the breakdown of a group's internal structure as causes of collective action. A similar model was applied to prisons by Sykes (1958), who argued that riots occurred when authorities suppressed the pre-existing social order and allowed unruly, violence-prone inmates to gain pre-eminence. In examining both sets of interviews, we found no evidence that there was much of an inmate social order even under the Rodriguez administration, that any group of inmates lost or gained relative power after 1975, or that such processes had anything to do with the outbreak of the riot.
Neither did we find the actions of most inmates during the riot to be irrational or characteristic of "magical beliefs." Most of the inmates we interviewed in 1985 described the riot as a more or less justified and successful attempt to relieve unjustly bad conditions of life. In fact, the quantity and quality of the violence, in its apparent savagery and irrationality, may have been the most effective possible strategy to motivate the state government to make sweeping improvements (Morris, 1983:225-26) .
The evidence does, though, support Piven's and Cloward's thesis of the advantages of mass defiance, at least in the prison setting. The New Mexico riot forced substantial prison reforms in the absence of a protest organization. Although work comparing the relative "success" of prison riots is needed before we draw any firm conclusion, it would appear that fear of another high-cost prison riot provides a deeper impetus for prison reform than the concessions that inmate negotiators sometimes force officials to agree to during a riot. Once order is restored, inmates have no means to ensure compliance with these concessions, nor are state and prison officials likely to feel bound by them since officials agreed to them under duress.
Furthermore, collective action may have distinct subtypes, some promoted by the processes identified by the breakdown theorists, others by the processes specified by the resource-mobilization theorists. One possibility is that relatively spontaneous, short-lived actions, such as riots, arise primarily from breakdown processes, whereas the more enduring forms, such as social movements, flow from resource-mobilization processes. We find, however, no support for this proposition in the current theoretical literature. Breakdown theorists apply their model to social movements (Kornhauser, 1959; Piven and Cloward, 1977) , and resource-mobilization theorists see their model as able to account for 4 Based, as it is, on Black's view of crime, this observation is tentative. Black and his associates (e.g., Baumgartner [1984] and Rieder [1984] ) have opened a new perspective on crime and its relationship to other forms of "social control." The effort is still in its early stages, however, and lacks confirmatory evidence. It may turn out that Black and his associates are explaining the exceptional case rather than the modal one or even a frequent one.
riots. More important, perhaps, are the prevailing historical and cultural conditions within which the collective action is embedded. For example, it could be argued that resourcemobilization processes-such as increased solidarity and heightened political struggles-were responsible for the urban riots of the late 1960s and the Attica riot of 1971. In contrast, both the black riots which occurred in Miami in 1980 (Porter and Dunn, 1984) The breakdown model, over the past decade, has fallen into disfavor among social movement researchers. This case study suggests that breakdown processes can contribute to at least certain instances of collective action. Furthermore, as noted at the outset, the evidence on the breakdown model in other contexts is equivocal, despite the claims of resource-mobilization theorists otherwise. The brief against the breakdown model rests on shaky empirical grounds.
